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Motivation
Advancing production technologies and the growing complexity of service industries will demand an increasingly larger share of highly quali…ed workers in the future labour force. At the same time, the ageing of workforce will not only depress overall labour supply but also put strains on public …nances, as old age-related spending is expected to grow at a higher rate than tax revenues and social security contributions (see also the discussion in Wildasin, 2012) . From the perspective of a developed country, this situation could be at least partly solved by promoting immigration of skilled workers or by attracting talented students from abroad who are allowed to continue to stay in their host country after graduation (e.g., Storesletten, 2000) . These permanent immigrants could …ll the gaps in the skilled labour force and generate pure and …scal externalities in their host country.
Developed countries could, for instance, implement policies to attract skilled workers from emerging or less developed economies (for brevity, referred to 'LDCs' henceforth). However, a more promising strategy might be to attract talented students from LDCs and provide them with the necessary professional, language and cultural skills at a university in the developed country. This local education then facilitates the integration of foreign graduates into the labour market of the host country. In fact, the number of foreign students in OECD countries has substantially increased in recent years, from 2.1 million in 2000 to 3.7 million in 2009, with a particularly large share of these students coming from China (18.2%) and India (7.3%) (OECD, 2011: 320 and 327) . On average, about 25% of foreign students in OECD countries stay in their host country upon graduation (OECD, 2011: 330) . 1 In the US, about two-thirds of all foreign-born PhDs remain in the country (Finn, 2003) , and the share of Indian and Chinese PhD students who intend to stay in the US after completing their thesis even exceeds 80% (Tremblay, 2002) .
According to recent estimates by the OECD, investing in the tertiary education of international students can turn out to be very bene…cial to the host countries. In the OECD, the net public return per student amounts to over USD 90,000 (55,000) for a man (woman) in present value terms (OECD, 2011: 165) . These …gures take into account the impact of higher education on tax revenues, social security contributions and social transfers. They also include direct and indirect public costs of higher education (OECD, 2011: 160) . In addition to this net public return, other positive e¤ects arise, such as a more balanced age structure in the host country and a culturally enriched learning environment for domestic students (e.g., NAFSA, Our model shows that an increase in the permanent migration probability (i.e., the stay rate upon graduation) makes it more attractive for the host country to invest in education quality, as this investment generates a larger net public return to the host country. We also show that the apparently negative impact on the human capital stock in the LDC need not occur. A higher probability of permanent migration strengthens the incentives of the host country to improve education quality. This boosts the human capital of all foreign students, including those who ultimately return to the LDC. As a consequence of this quality e¤ect, aggregate human capital in the LDC increases with the permanent migration probability as long as this probability is not too large, implying a qualitative brain gain. Once the permanent migration probability exceeds a critical level, however, a further increase depresses aggregate human capital in the LDC. The relationship between the net public return that returning graduates generate in the LDC and the permanent migration probability follows the same pattern. As the permanent migration probability increases, the net public return in the LDC …rst rises and then declines, in line with the changes in the human capital stock in the LDC.
At …rst glance, the identi…ed pattern is somewhat reminiscent of Haupt and Janeba (2009) and Stark and Wang (2002) . In both papers, low levels of mobility are bene…cial to LDCs, while high levels are detrimental to the welfare in LDCs. However, neither of these papers relates this outcome to the incentives for host countries to invest in the education of LDC students. In fact, our approach adds a new and complementary channel to the recent theoretical and empirical literature on 'brain gain'e¤ects (e.g., Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1997 Stark et al., , 1998 Vidal, 1998; Beine et al., 2001 Beine et al., , 2008 Mayr and Peri, 2009; Eggert et al., 2010) by focusing spe-ci…cally on public education investments of a developed host country. The standard explanations for bene…cial emigration of talented individuals focus instead on the impact of mobility on private investments in higher education. As skilled wages are higher in the rich world, the prospect of emigrating to a developed country raises the expected private returns to human capital even in remote and poor corners of the world. Therefore, more natives of developing countries invest in their education. Despite the temptations of the rich world, many students from developing countries end up staying in, or returning to, their home country. Consequently, developing countries enjoy a brain gain if the private incentive e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong.
In this literature, however, the quality of education and thus the private returns on investment on education are exogenously given (e.g., Stark and Wang, 2002) . Our paper di¤ers fundamentally from this approach, as we endogenise the education quality in the host country, which in turn a¤ects the private returns on education. That is, our model proposes a mechanism that is a natural extension of the standard 3 argument. In addition to the private incentives for students from LDC to invest into their human capital, there are also public incentives for host countries to invest in their education. The current paper focuses on this latter incentive.
Thus, our argument bridges a gap between the aforementioned literature on brain gain and recent papers on education policy with student mobility (e.g., Del Rey, 2001; Demange and Fenge, 2010; Demange et al., forthcoming; Gérard, 2007; Kemnitz, 2007; Lange, 2009 Lange, , 2013 . Both strands of the literature deal with complementary aspects of the same economic mechanism, but have-to the best of our knowledge-not yet been connected explicitly.
Our conclusions hinge crucially on the net public return that graduates generate, which in turn depends on future tax payments and social security contributions. According to many papers on tax competition, the taxes on the income of mobile, skilled workers tend to fall in the course of globalisation. Interestingly, the impact of a decline in the tax rates very much depends on the circumstances. If the permanent migration probability is low (high), a fall in tax rates will increase (decrease) human capital and welfare in the LDC and the rich host country. In an extension of our analysis, we derive and explain these contrasting outcomes.
Our basic model focuses on the incentives that foreign students set for the host country's education policy as well as on initiatives that speci…cally enhance the education of these students. However, many policies improve the quality of education in general, i.e., for domestic and international students, and cannot be targeted at a speci…c subgroup of students. To analyse how the presence of international students a¤ects the investment in such general improvements of education quality, we extend our basic model to include domestic students and consider only policies that enhance the quality of education in general. We show that our previous conclusions are robust with respect to this extension. Moreover, a rise in the permanent migration probability now generates a further positive e¤ect in the rich host country, since it induces an increase in the general education quality, which in turn boosts human capital and future gross income of domestic students.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our model. Section 3 characterises the optimal education policy of the rich country and analyses how this optimal policy responds to an increase in the permanent migration probability. In Section 4, we explore how the permanent migration probability a¤ects human capital and welfare. This section contains our key conclusion on brain gain and brain drain. Section 5 analyses the impact of declining income tax rates on education policy and welfare, while Section 6 examines whether including domestic students and general education quality alters our conclusions. In section 7, we discuss some policy implications of our analysis. Section 8 concludes the paper.
The Model
We explore our argument in a model with two countries, Poor P (the LDC) and Rich R (the developed country). Rich hosts a university, called the University of Rich (UoR). The government of Rich controls, directly or indirectly, the quality of education q, q 0, and the tuition fee t. An improvement in education quality increases both variable costs per student c(q) = q and …xed costs F (q), with F (0) = 0, F 0 (q) 0 and F 00 (q) > 0. The elasticity of marginal …xed costs with respect to quality (i.e., " := F 00 q=F 0 ) is constant; a case in point is a quadratic cost function.
There is no university in Poor; however, UoR is open to natives of Poor. Those individuals from Poor who enrol and study at UoR stay on and work in Rich after graduation with probability m, m 2 [0; 1], and return to and work in Poor with probability (1 m). The returning individuals are randomly drawn from the set of Poor's natives who have graduated at UoR. We refer to m as 'permanent migration probability'.
If individual k studies at UoR, this individual acquires human capital a k q and, upon graduation, earns gross wage w k (q) = a k q. That is, individual human capital a k q and wage w k increase with k's innate ability, denoted by a k , and the quality of the university education q. Individuals di¤er in their ability a k , a k 2 [0; 1], and ability is uniformly distributed across Poor's population, whose size is normalised to one. If individuals do not study at UoR, they do not acquire human capital and receive only a basic wage. For convenience, we set the basic wage to zero. 5 We refer to those individuals who graduate (do not graduate) as skilled (unskilled) workers.
The investment in the tertiary education of individual k yields a public return of w k (q), > 0, in the country where, after graduation, this individual resides and works. This public return can be interpreted in at least two di¤erent ways. Firstly, it can consist of k's tax payments and contributions to the social security systems net of any social transfers to individual k. Then, the net wage is (1 ) w k (q). Secondly, we can interpret w k (q) as the value of a positive human capital externality associated with higher education. Then, w k (q) stands for the overall income or bene…t generated by graduate k, and (1 ) w k (q) captures the share of this overall 5 We implicitly assume that skilled wages are the same in Poor and Rich. This simpli…cation is justi…ed, since we focus on the incentives for the host country to invest in education quality. These incentives are not qualitatively a¤ected by the assumption of equal wages across countries. We acknowledge, of course, that both base wages and skill premia vary across countries (e.g., Rosenzweig 2006 Rosenzweig , 2008 . Importantly, however, the price level is lower in less developed countries than in wealthy ones. This di¤erence in price levels at least diminishes the gap in real income, which ultimately matters for the welfare of workers. For instance, Baruch et al. (2007) point out that Chinese and Indian individuals with a foreign university degree have excellent career opportunities back in their home countries, creating a very respectable living standard. income or bene…t that accrues to individual k as personal income. In the following analysis, we refer to the tax interpretation of the parameter . However, it is important to bear in mind that interpreting the parameter as a human capital externality leads to exactly the same results.
The timing of decisions is as follows: Rich chooses its education quality q in the …rst stage and its tuition fee t in the second stage. It maximises the net public return to Rich generated by foreign students, as detailed in objective function (3) in Section 3. In the third stage, the natives of Poor decide whether they study at UoR or whether they do not. They maximise their disposable income, i.e., wage income minus tuition fee. All other actions occur 'automatically'. Students complete their education. They continue to stay in Rich with permanent migration probability m or return to Poor with probability (1 m). Graduate k earns wage w k (q) and generates public return a k q in the individual's …nal country of residence.
As outlined in Section 1, people have become increasingly mobile over recent decades of globalisation. More and more students study abroad and seek work in their host country after graduation. In the model, a rise in the permanent migration probability captures this development, and we analyse how such a rise a¤ects education quality, tuition fees, and welfare in Poor and Rich. In this context, the term 'permanent'should not be taken literally. It is only supposed to refer to the fact that some foreign students do not leave their host country immediately after graduation, but continue to stay and work there for at least some time.
Globalisation has, of course, further implications. For instance, it tends to depress tax rates of highly skilled and mobile workers. Therefore, in an extension we analyse how a change in the tax rate a¤ects our conclusions. Also, as we ignore domestic students in our basic model, we include them in a further extension. However, it turns out that our results are very robust with respect to this extension.
Education Policy and Permanent Migration
In this section, we …rst determine the education quality, the tuition fee, and the number of students in the subgame-perfect equilibrium. Afterwards, we explore how the education policy and the number of students vary with the permanent migration probability.
Applying backward induction, we begin with analysing the optimal decisions of the potential students. In the third stage, each native of Poor decides whether she studies at UoR, which yields disposable income DI k = (1 ) w k (q) t = (1 ) a k q t, or stays at home, which leads to disposable income DI k = 0. Only 6 individuals whose ability a exceeds the threshold valuê
…nd it bene…cial to study abroad and pay tuition fees. They can convert education quality q into a higher net wage (1 ) aq very e¤ectively, and thus at least recoup the initial private education costs t. As expected, the lower the tax rate or the tuition fee t, the more natives of Poor choose to study in Rich (i.e., the lower the threshold ability levelâ). Similarly, a higher education quality q induces more natives of Poor to enrol at UoR.
As ability is distributed uniformly, aggregate ability of the individuals who study at UoR is
In the second stage, Rich chooses its tuition fee t. Taking the implication of its policy on the ensuing decisions of the potential students into account, it maximises the net public return (NPR) generated by foreign students:
The …rst term on the RHS captures the future tax revenues. As discussed in Section 2, an alternative interpretation is that this term captures a positive human capital externality. The tax revenues increase with aggregate human capital Aq, permanent migration probability m, and tax rate . The second and third term show aggregate tuition fees and education costs, respectively. The sum of these three terms captures the net public return to Rich. A higher tuition fee per student has ambiguous e¤ects on aggregate tuition fees, as the payment per student goes up while the number of students falls. Moreover, the decline in the number of students in response to a higher fee reduces tax revenues and aggregate education costs. Balancing the positive and negative e¤ects gives the optimal tuition fee t and the resulting threshold levelâ :
which follow directly from the …rst-order condition @N P R R =@t = 0 in combination with threshold value (1) and aggregate ability (2). 6 To avoid tedious discussions of 7 boundary solutions, we assume that for the marginal cost parameter 2 [0; 1 ) is satis…ed. Then, an interior solutionâ 2 (0; 1) is guaranteed for all m 2 [0; 1] (see Eq. (4)). Otherwise, Rich would prefer to relinquish educating any foreign students for a su¢ ciently low permanent migration probability m, since it would not be able to charge a tuition fee such that higher education for students from Poor were economically bene…cial to Rich.
In the …rst stage, Rich chooses the optimal education quality q . Inserting tuition fee (4) into objective function (3) and maximising the resulting expression with respect to q yields the …rst-order condition
An improvement in education quality increases aggregate human capital and gross wages in Rich. It thus boosts tax revenues in Rich (see …rst term of the derivative). Moreover, a higher education quality enables Rich to raise tuition fees, as it makes studying at UoR more bene…cial to the natives of Poor (see second term). On the downside, a higher education quality increases both variable and …xed costs (see third and fourth term). In the optimum, Rich balances the marginal bene…ts and marginal costs of enhancing the quality of education. We are interested in how education quality, tuition fees and enrolment depend on the permanent migration probability. Our conclusions on these relationships are summarised in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Permanent Migration Probability and Higher Education (i) The quality of education at UoR and the number of Poor natives who study at UoR increase with the permanent migration probability. Formally, dq =dm > 0 and dâ =dm < 0.
(ii) The quality-adjusted tuition fee, de…ned as tuition fee per quality unit (i.e., t =q ), declines with the permanent migration probability. Formally, d (t =q ) =dm < 0.
(iii) The tuition fee increases (decreases) with the permanent migration probability if and only if the elasticity of marginal …xed costs is below (above) the threshold level b " = (1 +â ) = (1 â ). Formally, dt =dm R 0 , " Q b ".
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix to focus on the economic intuition in the main text. The explanation for parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 is straightforward. As discussed above, foreign students who continue to stay in Rich after graduation generate tax revenues in Rich. An increase in the probability of permanent migration makes it more likely that this gain does indeed arise in Rich. Consequently, Rich …nds it bene…cial to invest more in students from Poor. It further increases the human capital of foreign students, through raising the education quality, and attracts more of them, through lowering the quality-adjusted tuition fee. In response to these policy changes, more natives of Poor migrate to Rich to study there. 7 Whether the tuition fee itself falls or rises depends on the additional …xed costs caused by increasing education quality. If enhancing education quality is not too expensive (i.e., if the elasticity of marginal …xed costs falls short of the threshold b "), Rich will signi…cantly increase its education quality. The improved attractiveness of UoR will then be used to raise the tuition fee as well. By contrast, if enhancing education quality is rather expensive (i.e., if the elasticity of marginal …xed costs exceeds the threshold b "), Rich will only moderately increase the education quality. It will then attract further foreign students mainly by cutting its tuition fees.
Welfare, Brain Drain, and Migration
We can now analyse how a rise in the permanent migration probability a¤ects welfare in Poor and Rich, and whether it causes a brain gain or brain drain from the perspective of Poor. In this context, we de…ne brain gain (brain drain) as an increase (decrease) in the aggregate human capital in Poor after return migration has taken place. Recall that only those Poor citizens who study at UoR build up human capital. Thus, the aggregate human capital in Poor is given by
The net public return that returning graduates generate in Poor is simply proportional to their aggregate human capital: 8
Then, the impact of a marginal increase in the permanent migration probability m on human capital HC P and net public return N P R P is
Derivative (8) shows three di¤erent e¤ects of a higher permanent migration probability m on aggregate human capital, and thus net public return, in Poor. The …rst term captures that a higher probability m means less return migration, and thus a lower human capital stock in Poor. The second term re ‡ects that, in response to the changes in education policy, more individuals from Poor study at UoR. This e¤ect increases human capital in Poor, as some student migrants return. Finally, the third term captures the positive e¤ect of the permanent migration probability on the quality of education in Rich, and thus on the human capital of return migrants. These three e¤ects lead to our key result, which is stated in the Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Human Capital in Poor after Return Migration Suppose that the tax rate is su¢ ciently large. Then, human capital HC P and net public return N P R P increase (decrease) with permanent migration probability m if and only if probability m is below (strictly above) a unique threshold level e m 2 (0; 1). That is,
This proposition establishes a non-monotonic relationship between the human capital stock and the net public return in Poor on the one hand and the permanent migration probability on the other hand. A rise in the permanent migration probability does indeed cause a brain gain and an increase in the net public return, but only if this probability is not too large. Once the permanent migration probability exceeds a critical level, a further rise in permanent migration has the opposite e¤ect and leads to a brain drain and a fall in the net public return to Poor (see Figure 1 ). Let us explore the intuition for this conclusion.
From the perspective of Poor, there is a quantity-quality trade-o¤. If the permanent migration probability is low (i.e., m < e m), many students return from Rich to Poor upon graduation, but their human capital is rather low. In this situation, Poor can bene…t from stronger incentives for Rich to improve the quality of education, and an increase in the permanent migration probability makes it more attractive for Rich to invest in its education quality. The resulting increase in the human capital of returning students more than compensates Poor for the loss of skilled workers due to By contrast, if the permanent migration probability is high (i.e., m e m), the host country already provides a high education quality. Thus, the acquired human capital of the students who return from Rich is also already large, and Poor cannot bene…t that much from a further increase in the education quality abroad. Instead, the human capital stock in Poor will su¤er substantially if even fewer students return. Under these circumstances, a further increase in the permanent migration probability m causes a brain drain and a drop in net public return.
To understand the novelty of this result, recall that a change in probability m has no direct e¤ect on the decisions of the students. For a given education policy (t; q), variations in m have no impact on the students'incentives to acquire education and study abroad, and thus leave threshold (1) unaltered. The probability of permanent migration a¤ects human capital and the resulting net public return in Poor only via its impact on the education policy of Rich. As pointed out above, this mechanism distinguishes our paper from the previous literature on potential brain gains.
There is one quali…cation to be made. A brain gain and a rise in net public return to Poor can only arise if the tax rate is su¢ ciently high. Otherwise, Rich cannot signi…cantly bene…t from permanent migration, and has no incentive to su¢ ciently enhance its education quality, as probability m increases. Consequently, Poor cannot su¢ ciently bene…t from better educated students who return from Rich. Formally, e m = 0 results in this case. 9 A change in the permanent migration probability has an unambiguous impact on the disposable income of graduate k, i.e., on
where we made use of the optimal tuition fee (4).
Proposition 3 Disposable Income of Graduates
The disposable income DI k of graduate k increases with the permanent migration probability m. Formally, dDI k =dm > 0.
Proposition 3 follows from the fact that, as the permanent migration probability rises, the quality of education increases, too, while the quality-adjusted tuition fee declines. Consequently, higher education becomes more bene…cial to each graduate and the number of graduates grows.
Finally, let us consider welfare in Rich. We can immediately conclude:
Proposition 4 Welfare in Rich The net public return N P R R increases with the permanent migration probability. Formally, dN P R R =dm > 0.
Rich can only gain from a rise in permanent migration and, thus, aggregate human capital. The net public return automatically surges even without any policy changes. By adjusting education quality and tuition fees to a higher permanent migration probability, the net public return to Rich further increases.
To summarise, an increase in the permanent migration probability is certainly to the bene…t of the graduates from Poor who bene…t from a higher education quality and a lower quality-adjusted tuition fee. Similarly, Rich also gains from a higher permanent migration, since it drives up the net public return generated by international students. Regarding the net public return that arises in Poor, the picture is mixed. For a su¢ ciently low permanent migration probability, a marginal increase in permanent migration raises aggregate human capital in Poor and the net public return to Poor. However, once permanent migration exceeds the threshold level e m, both human capital and the net public return in Poor drop, as the permanent migration probability increases further. 9 A su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for e m > 0 is = (1 ) > 6=(2 + 9") (see proof in the Appendix). The minimum tax rate that is required for Proposition 2 to hold depends on the cost parameter . For instance, if is su¢ ciently close to 1 , a brain gain and an increase in the net public return to Poor occur for all 2 [0; 1).
Declining Tax Rates
In the era of globalisation, people have become more internationally mobile. A larger share of individuals do not only study abroad, but continue to stay abroad after graduation. In the last two sections, we have analysed the implications of such a rise in permanent migration.
However, globalisation has wider implications. For instance, a large body of literature on international tax competition suggests that globalisation curbs the governments' ability to tax increasingly mobile production factors such as capital and highly skilled workers (see, e.g., Genschel and Schwarz, 2011; Keen and Konrad, 2012 , for extensive recent surveys). More speci…cally, since income tax rates of competing jurisdictions are strategic complements (e.g., Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005) , the observed locational choices of workers (e.g., Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2005; Schmidtheiny, 2006, for Switzerland; Hsieh and Wang, 2011 , for the US) provide indirect evidence for the existence of local and international income tax competition between districts and countries for high-skilled workers. These e¤ects can be expected to become even stronger in the future, as international economic integration and globalisation intensify.
We have so far ignored this aspect by assuming that tax rates are constant. While a fully- ‡edged incorporation of tax competition is beyond the scope of this paper, we will at least sketch to what extent falling tax rates reinforce or qualify our previous results. To this end, we …rst explore how a uniform decline in tax rates in the two countries, which might result from intensi…ed tax competition, a¤ects education quality, quality-adjusted tuition fees, and enrolment.
Proposition 5 Tax Rates and Higher Education (i) For a su¢ ciently low (high) permanent migration probability, a decline in the tax rate leads to a rise (fall) in education quality q and the number of foreign students enrolled at UoR (1 â ).
(ii) The quality-adjusted tuition fee t =q increases, as the tax rate declines.
To understand Proposition 5, consider …rst the case of a low permanent migration probability. In this case, a decline in the tax rate has no signi…cant impact on the net public return to Rich, since the vast majority of foreign students return to their home country anyway. However, the increase in future net income of graduates fosters demand for higher education in Rich, which becomes less price-elastic. In response, Rich increases its tuition fees. As foreign students become more attractive tuition fee payers, Rich also raises education quality to further enhance the appeal of UoR. But as the increase in education quality does not keep up with the rise in tuition fees, the quality-adjusted tuition fee goes up, which curbs the rise in student numbers. Now, consider the case of a high permanent migration probability. If a large share of foreign students continue to stay in Rich after graduation, a drop in the tax rate signi…cantly reduces net public return that accrues to Rich, since it causes a substantial drop in tax revenues. As foreign students become less attractive, Rich lowers its education quality, and the quality-adjusted tuition fee again increases. These policy changes lead to a fall in enrolment.
Having explored the implications of lower tax rates on education policy and enrolment, we can now analyse how welfare in Poor and Rich is a¤ected.
Proposition 6 Tax Rates and Welfare (i) Suppose the tax rate is su¢ ciently large initially. Then, for a su¢ ciently low (high) permanent migration probability, a marginal decline in the tax rate increases (decreases) the net public return in Poor and Rich, N P R P and N P R R .
(ii) For a su¢ ciently high permanent migration probability, some potential graduates are worse o¤ in terms of disposable income DI k , as the tax rate declines.
In the case of a high permanent migration probability, the welfare e¤ects of a falling tax rate are straightforward. Education quality and the number of graduates decline, which reduces the gross wage sum. Both the fall in the wage sum and the drop in the tax rate depress tax revenues in Poor and Rich. Consequently, the net public return certainly plummets in both Poor and Rich.
Also, not only are there fewer graduates, but some of them must be worse o¤. Just consider the marginal students after the decline in the tax rate; that is, the students who are now indi¤erent between studying and not studying, and whose disposable incomes are thus zero. As they were non-marginal students before the tax change, their disposable incomes were positive, and they lose out for sure.
With low permanent migration probability, the situation is more complicated, as both the quality of education and the number of students go up when the tax rate falls. The policy changes promote human capital formation and increase the gross wage sum. These positive e¤ects are particularly important when the permanent migration probability is low, since the incentive for Rich to invest in education quality is rather low in this case. Then, the boost in the wage sum more than compensates Poor for a lower tax rate, and the net public return to Poor increases. In Rich, a higher wage sum and higher tuition fees outweigh the decline in the tax rate and the rise in public education costs. Consequently, the net public return increases in both Poor and Rich.
Summarising the E¤ects of Globalisation Let us now combine the conclusions in Sections 3, 4, and 5. If the process of globalisation causes a decline in tax rates in combination with a rise in the share of foreign graduates who continue to stay in their host country, then the following picture emerges. Globalisation tends to increase education quality, the number of students, the net public return in Poor and Rich, and the disposable income of graduates as long as the permanent migration probability remains fairly low. In this case, the e¤ects of falling tax rates and rising permanent migration reinforce each other.
With a fairly high permanent migration probability, the situation is more complicated. Then, the net public return that accrues to Poor certainly drops. However, regarding all the other variables of the system, the conclusions are now ambiguous. Whilst an increase in permanent migration reduces the quality-adjusted tuition fee and drives up education quality and the net public return in Rich, a decline in the tax rate has exactly the opposite e¤ect. Even the disposable income of some graduates will decline if the tax rate falls.
The interplay between tuition fees and tax rates is particularly interesting, as they serve, at least partially, as substitutes. A high tax rate reduces the demand for education in Rich and makes this demand more price-elastic, thus curbing the ability of Rich to charge high tuition fees. By contrast, declining tax rates enable Rich to charge higher tuition fees, thus e¤ectively replacing tax revenues with fee payments. For a su¢ ciently low permanent migration probability, this replacement is bene…cial from the perspective of Rich, since all foreign students pay tuition fees, but only those who continue to stay in Rich will pay taxes. As tuition fees are only imperfect substitutes for taxes, Rich cannot bene…t any more from falling tax rates once the permanent migration probability is fairly high and a large share of foreign students do continue to stay in their host country.
Tuition fees frequently have an advantage over taxes. While it is often legally di¢ cult to levy higher taxes on foreigners than on natives, doing so with tuition fees is accepted practice in many countries. 10 In the EU, the non-discrimination principle limits this practice; that is, EU member states are not permitted to treat nondomestic EU students di¤erently than domestic students. However, these countries are still allowed to charge higher tuition fees for non-EU students than for domestic 10 Empirically, we observe a general tendency for tuition fees to rise in the OECD countries (cf. OECD, 2012: 272), where substantial increases of annual average tuition fees charged by public tertiary-type A educational institutions (e.g., institutions which o¤er second-degree programmes, such as master's degrees) have been reported for 1995-2009. Countries with strong fee increases include Australia, Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the US (for the US, see also College Board, 2012) . At the same time, however, some countries, particularly in Scandinavia, decided to keep higher education free of charge. Austria is the only OECD country in which tuition fees had fallen slightly during the reported time period. students. The possibility of di¤erentiating tuition fees becomes important once we include domestic students in our analysis, which leads us to the next section.
Domestic Students
In the previous sections, we have ignored the existence of domestic students. We now include them in our analysis. Even with domestic students, many university initiatives aim at enhancing, speci…cally or predominantly, the education quality that foreign students experience. In many programmes in English speaking countries, particularly at the postgraduate level, foreign students constitute the overwhelming majority of participants. Furthermore, universities speci…cally invest in the quality of the education that foreign students receive by setting up support programmes. Measures include, for instance, tutorials for students from speci…c countries and transition courses to bridge the gap between the education system of the students' home country and of their host country. Many countries, particularly those outside the English speaking world, have set up speci…c international programmes in English geared towards the needs of foreign students.
Nevertheless, a large share of spending equally enhances the education quality of domestic and foreign students. Therefore, we have to di¤erentiate between spending on general education quality, which bene…ts both domestic and foreign students, and on speci…c education quality, which bene…ts foreign students only. As far as spending on speci…c education quality is concerned, the conclusions in Propositions 1 to 4 in Sections 3 and 4 remain valid even if we include domestic students. The question arises whether taking general education quality into account alters the previous results.
To give an answer to this question, we extend our simple model: domestic students now join foreign students at UoR. We ignore speci…c education quality, as it has already been analysed above, and assume that all students face the same education quality q g , where the subscript g stands for 'general'. An improvement in education quality increases the costs of education as described in Section 2. Importantly, Rich can di¤erentiate tuition fees. It charges domestic students tuition fee t R and foreign students t P . 11 The potential domestic graduates have the same characteristics as the foreign ones. In particular, the innate ability of natives a k , a k 2 [0; 1], is also uniformly distributed across the population of Rich, whose size is also equal to one. (The assumption that the foreign and domestic populations are identical does not drive our conclusions qualitatively.) Native k who studies at UoR acquires human capital a k q g and, upon graduation, earns wage w k (q) = a k q g , as the foreign counterpart does. Natives who do not study receive a basic wage as unskilled workers. This basic wage is still set to zero. All income in Rich is taxed at rate , since the government is not allowed to di¤erentiate taxes on the basis of citizenship.
Repeating our previous line of reasoning yields the threshold values for domestic and foreign studentŝ 12) and the aggregate ability of domestic and foreign individuals who study at UoR
which are in line with their counterparts (1) and (2) in Section 3. The government of Rich only considers the welfare of its citizens. As we now take into account domestic students, the objective function of Rich now includes the aggregate income of natives net of their education costs in addition to the net public return generated by international students:
The …rst two terms on the RHS capture the new components, the gross wage sum of natives and their variable education costs. The other four terms on the RHS show the net public return as de…ned in Eq. (3). Note that the tax payments of natives and their tuition fees do not explicitly show up in welfare (14). As they reduce private spending by the same amount by which they increase public and university revenues, they cancel each other out exactly.
The timing of the decisions is the same as before. In the second stage, Rich chooses the tuition fees. The optimal tuition fees for domestic and foreign students are given by
yielding the equilibrium thresholdŝ
The number of students from Poor and, for given education quality, the tuition fee for Poor's natives are the same as in the scenario in Sections 2 and 3 (see Eq. (4)), and so are the explanations for this outcome. Consequently, the e¤ect of an increase in permanent migration on the enrolment of foreign students and the direct impact of permanent migration on the tuition fee for foreign students remain unaltered.
The tuition fee imposed on domestic students is equal to the 'tax-corrected' variable education costs. This fee level ensures that only the individuals whose gross incomes after graduation exceed the variable education costs will study; that is, all natives whose innate ability is above the cost parameter . The education decisions of the natives are thus e¢ cient. Importantly, tuition fees for, and enrolment of, natives are independent of the permanent migration probability. Moreover, the tuition fee for domestic students is lower than the tuition fee for foreign ones. This result simply re ‡ects the fact that Rich extracts as much surplus as possible from Poor's students.
In the …rst stage, Rich decides on the education quality q g . The optimal quality level is implicitly determined by the …rst-order condition
The …rst two terms of the derivative (17) re ‡ect the impact of an improvement in education quality on the gross wage sum of natives and the variable costs of educating native students. The magnitudes of these two e¤ects do not hinge on the permanent migration probability. The other four terms of the derivative (17) and the economic explanations for them are well-known from the …rst-order condition (5) and the discussion in Section 3. The two new terms obviously change the optimal level of the education quality compared to the solution in Section 3. However, as the …rst two terms of derivative (17) do not depend on the permanent migration probability, and as the other terms are identical to the expressions in the …rst-order condition (5), the impact of a change in the permanent migration probability on education quality is qualitatively the same as in the case without domestic students.
As we have explored, explicitly considering domestic students does not change the e¤ects of a rise in the permanent migration probability on education quality, tuition fees for foreign students, and their enrolment. Therefore, the impacts of a higher permanent migration probability on the net public return in Poor, the disposable income of graduates from Poor, and the net public return in Rich generated by international students are also una¤ected by the inclusion of domestic students. Thus, Propositions 1 to 4 are still valid.
Political Implications
In this paper, we argue that a higher permanent migration probability incentivises the host country to improve its education quality, since it increases the expected public return to education investments. A higher education quality, in turn, raises the human capital of foreign graduates. As long as the permanent migration probability is not too large, the positive quality e¤ect increases both human capital and net public return in the LDC, despite the fact that a smaller share of graduates return to the LDC.
From the perspective of the host country, an increasing permanent migration probability is bene…cial. It increases the net public return generated by foreign graduates and, as the rich host country is induced to invest more in general education quality, also boosts the human capital and thus aggregate income of domestic graduates. Consequently, the interests of the rich host country are aligned with those of the LDC as long as the permanent migration probability is su¢ ciently low. However, a con ‡ict of interest will arise if permanent migration exceeds some critical level. As explained in the previous sections, the brain gain to the LDC turns into a brain drain once the permanent migration probability exceeds a critical level, while the developed country still bene…ts from a further rise in the permanent migration probability. (Discussing the political implications of our analysis, we again use the terms developed and less developed countries instead of the abbreviations Rich and Poor.)
Education Policy An obvious political implication of our analysis is that a developed country can bene…t from adjusting its education policy to changes in the permanent migration behaviour. The incentive to do so is likely to be particularly strong in host countries for which student migration is, and has always been, an important channel for recruiting high-skilled workers. A case in point is Australia, where international students make up nearly 20% of total tertiary enrolments in 2007 (OECD, 2009: 308) , and where about 20% of all high-skilled immigrants in 2005-2006 had initially come to Australia as foreign students and then continued to stay there as skilled workers after their graduation (Chalo¤ and Lemaitre, 2009: 25) . In contrast, countries with a high domestic supply of talented students might experience a smaller net public return to investments in foreign students. Thus, the incentives to align education policy to a growing student mobility can be expected to di¤er across countries.
Similarly, we expect that countries deal di¤erently with the task of adjusting education quality, since the national education systems vary widely across key target countries of international student migration (e.g., Australia, France, Germany, the UK, and the US). In countries with a predominantly public university sector, such as many continental European countries, governments can intervene more directly and allocate resources, for instance, to providing additional tutors, language courses, and international programs. By contrast, countries with a strong private university sector may resort to indirect measures to in ‡uence education quality for, and the in ‡ow of, international students.
Measures may include, for example, funding public academic exchange services. Such services may not only provide scholarships, but also initiate programmes to promote the integration of foreign students into the host country. For instance, consider the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The DAAD o¤ered scholarships for foreigners worth e86 million and support for the internationalisation of German universities totalling e68 million in 2011 (DAAD, 2011: 14) . Measures included …nancial support for 39 international doctoral programmes at German universities and for the STIBET initiative. 12 STIBET is a combined scholarship and guidance counselling programme which …nances improved supervision of foreign students and doctoral candidates at German universities, and is supposed to "make Germany more attractive and more competitive as a place of study" (DAAD, 2011: 29) .
Our model implies that a developed country not only bene…ts from improving its education quality, as international student migration increases, but it might also bene…t from reducing the tuition fees for foreign students. New Zealand serves as an potential example. As mentioned in Section 1, educating foreign students is an explicit part of a socio-economic development strategy in some Asian Paci…c countries. In this context, New Zealand has not only increased its education quality in the last decades, but also lowered tuition fees for international students in 2005 to the same level as those paid by domestic students (OECD, 2011: 325) . This policy change has made New Zealand a much more appealing destination for international students. In particular, it has signi…cantly improved its competitive edge relative to other English speaking destinations, which o¤er similar programs at higher costs. According to OECD (2011) , new competitors such as New Zealand may explain the comparatively small rise in foreign enrolments in the UK and the US in the last decade.
International competition between potential host countries may cause a 'raceto-the-top' in terms of education subsidies or, equivalently, a 'race-to-the-bottom' in terms of tuition fees. 13 Another outcome of intensi…ed competition for students can be an increasing quality di¤erentiation between countries and institutions of higher education (Haupt et al., 2011; Kemnitz, 2007) . That is, while some countries predominantly o¤er high quality education and charge high tuition fees, other countries tend to o¤er average quality programmes at a lower price. Students selfselect into these di¤erent education systems, depending on their individual ability. This product di¤erentiation weakens the tuition fee competition between countries and institutions. Moreover, those countries traditionally o¤ering excellent education quality might have a …rst-mover advantage, as they are already attracting the best students. The investment necessary to close the gap in education quality might not pay o¤ for potential competitors, which perpetuates the advantage of the leading countries.
Immigration Policy Our conclusions also have implications for immigration policy, as a rich host country faces incentives to promote permanent migration of graduates. Several countries have indeed initiated policies to simplify the access to their labour markets, by introducing special visas and permits enabling international students to stay for several months or years to …nd a job after graduation. For instance, Germany introduced a temporary residence permit valid for one year; the UK allows foreign graduates to stay for a further year under the 'International Graduate Scheme'; the US has reserved 20,000 H1-B visas for graduates; and Canada enables foreign graduates to stay for up to three years under the 'Post-Graduation Work Permit Program' (Lange 2010) . In some countries, this new kind of approach to international students constitutes a fundamental break with the past in which foreign graduates often had to leave their host countries within days after their last exam because their visa only allowed them to study there.
The US serves as an interesting example that shows how strongly changes in visa policy can a¤ect student migration ‡ows. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, US immigration regulations became much more restrictive. As a result, studying in the US became increasingly di¢ cult for prospective foreign students in general and for those from Muslim countries in particular (e.g., Ewers and Lewis, 2008) . In the …rst years after the new regulations had been introduced, the number of foreign students in the US dropped (IIE, 2011) , indicating a deterioration of the competitive edge of the US. 14 The implications can be substantial. For instance, Chellaraj et al. (2008) suggest that a 10% rise in the number of foreign graduate students would increase patent applications in the US by 4.5%. 15 Visa restrictions tend to work in the opposite direction and could thus signi…cantly impede innovative activities in the US. This example also shows that there is not always a positive relationship between globalisation and permanent migration. Moreover, restrictive immigration regulation can seriously undermine a country's competitiveness in the long run.
Taxation and Tuition Fees A drop in tax rates will, at least partly, be compensated by an increase in tuition fees. Replacing income taxes with tuition fees even reinforces the bene…ts from foreign students and the incentives to invest in their education quality if permanent migration is su¢ ciently low. In this case, a decline in income tax rates increases human capital and welfare in the LDC and the rich host country. By contrast, decreasing tax rates are detrimental to the formation of human capital and to welfare in the LDC and the rich host country if the permanent migration probability is high. This conclusion reinforces the worry that …erce tax competition damages economic development, as it undermines public support for higher education (see Lange, 2010 , for a discussion of this issue). However, a more thorough analysis that explains tax rates, education quality and tuition fees endogenously is needed to assess this issue more comprehensively.
Limits to the ability to tax income of mobile sources may have downsides which are not covered in the current model. Most importantly, such limits restrict a government's ability to defer the contributions of individuals to the costs of higher education. Traditionally, many countries have charged rather low tuition fees, but then levied rather high taxes on high incomes. This approach has insured people against income risks and helped them to overcome credit constraints, which would otherwise have deterred them from undertaking higher education. In the future, however, such a combination of low tuition fees and high taxes might neither be possible nor optimal.
Alternatively, governments could implement income-contingent loans for higher education as a means to tackle the ine¢ ciencies resulting from credit constraints and risk aversion. These loan schemes are discussed in-depth in Barr (2012) and, from a politico-economic perspective, Del Rey and Racionero (2012) . Enforcing repayments of income-contingent loans from internationally mobile graduates might, however, be a tricky issue and requires some form of cooperation and exchange of information between countries. Thus, an increase in mobility tends to raise the administrative costs of such schemes, which limits their advantages over tax-…nanced higher education.
Policies of the LDC Finally, let us turn to the political implications for the LDC. As long as the permanent migration probability is su¢ ciently low, the LDC bene…ts from sending its talented individuals to the developed country for study. Consequently, the government of the LDC may …nd it bene…cial to promote studying abroad by providing scholarships. The induced increase in the number of international students would incentivise the host country to improve its education quality further. Scholarship programmes might therefore raise the number and quality of returning graduates. However, there are two severe limitations to the success of scholarships. Firstly, scholarships drive up tuition fees in the host country, since they increase demand for university places. Secondly, scholarships also tend to increase the time natives of the LDC spend studying abroad, which could make it even more likely that the foreign students continue to stay in their host country after graduation (Oosterbeek and Webbink, 2011) .
If the permanent migration probability is too high, the LDC will bene…t from more return migration. To achieve this, the government of the LDC could provide …nancial incentives for graduates to return. This issue was already discussed in the classical literature on brain drain (e.g., Bhagwati and Hamada 1974) . Traditional recommendations include a brain drain tax levied on graduates staying abroad and tax subsidies for returning graduates. The more recent debate on brain drain taxes advocates a combination of these two elements. For instance, Wilson (2008) proposes that the governments of LDCs reduce the income tax of returning graduates who previously paid a 'voluntary'brain drain tax, whilst charging those who evaded the brain drain tax the full income tax. However, analysing this issue requires a model with an endogenous permanent migration probability, which is beyond the scope of our paper.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present a novel channel for brain gain. Considering individuals from an LDC who study in a rich host country, we argue that a higher permanent migration probability induces the host country to improve its education quality. A higher education quality raises the human capital of the students returning to the LDC. As long as the permanent migration probability is not too large, this positive quality e¤ect increases human capital and welfare in both the LDC and the developed country. This mechanism is novel because the brain gain is not driven by private incentives for Poor's population to acquire human capital (as in the standard literature), but by public incentives for the rich host country to change its education policy. Moreover, a decline in tax rates will reinforce the brain gain if the permanent migration probability is su¢ ciently low. Including domestic students in our analysis has no qualitative impact on the conclusions derived in the model with international students only.
This paper also indicates some promising areas for further research. For instance, the interaction between international competition in taxes, tuition fees and education quality is complex and deserves more attention. Previous papers have only analysed international competition in tuition fees and taxes (e.g., Krieger and Lange, 2010) or international competition in tuition fees and education quality (e.g., Haupt et al., 2011) . Another interesting research question is how the rise of high quality institutions in developing and emerging economies will shake up the competition for international students. Institutions in emerging countries such as China are increasingly reaching out to foreign students. They will become increasingly competitive in the future, by being more able to o¤er good quality education at a very reasonable price.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) Using Eqs.
(2) and (4) to rearrange the …rst-order condition (5) yields @N P R R @q = (1 + ) (1 â ) 2 2â @F @q = 0.
The reformulated derivative (18) helps us to calculate the second derivatives @ 2 N P R R @q@m = 1 + 1 +â 1 â â @F @q > 0 and @ 2 N P R R @q 2 = @ 2 F @q 2 < 0,
where we used the …rst-order condition (5) to evaluate @ 2 N P R R = (@q@m) at the optimal quality level q . Using Eqs. (18) and (19), we apply comparative statics, which yields dq dm = @ 2 N P R R @q@m / @ 2 N P R R @q 2 = 1 + 1 +â 1 â â @F=@q @ 2 F=@q 2 > 0. (20) Finally, dâ =dm < 0 follows directly from Eq. (4); that is, d (1 â ) =dm > 0.
(ii) Eq. (4) implies d (t =q ) =dm = (1 ) dâ =dm < 0.
(iii) Using Eqs. (20) and (4), we …nd that dt dm = (1 ) 1 + (â ) 2 q 1 +â " (1 â ) 1 R 0 , " Q 1 +â 1 â =: b ".
Proof of Proposition 2 First, we evaluate derivative (8) at the maximum permanent migration probability m = 1, which yields dHC P =dmj m=1 = Aq < 0.
Second, we evaluate derivative (8) at the minimum permanent migration probability m = 0. Using Eqs. (2), (4) and (20) 
Further note thatâ j m=0 = (1 + ) =2 and thus G(0; ; ) = 1 2 + (1 + ) 2 8 (1 ) 2 + 2 (1 )
Since @G(0; ; )=@ > 0, G(0; ; ) reaches its minimum for = 0 (recall that 2 [0; 1 )), with G(0; 0; ) = 3 8 + 2 (1 ) 1 4 + 9 8" R 0 , 1 R 6 2 + 9" :
That is, if = (1 ) > 6= (2 + 9"), then G(0; ; ) > 0, and thus dHC P =dmj m=0 > 0, for all .
Third, HC P is strictly concave in m, since d 2 HC P =dm 2 < 0 (which follows from Eqs. (4) and (22)).
Since d 2 HC P =dm 2 < 0, dHC P =dmj m=1 < 0 and, for = (1 ) > 6= (2 + 9"), dHC P =dmj m=0 > 0 for all , the intermediate value theorem implies that, for = (1 ) > 6= (2 + 9"), there exists a unique e m 2 (0; 1) : dHC P =dm R 0 , m Q e m for all .
As N P R P = HC P , repeating the previous line of reasoning leads to dN P R P =dm R 0 , m Q e m for all .
Proof of Proposition 3
Rearranging Eq. (11) yields
where we used Eq. (4). Eq. (25) implies that dDI k =dm = @DI k =@m + (@DI k =@q) (dq o =dm) > 0, since @DI k =@m > 0, @DI k =@q > 0, and dq o =dm > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
This conclusion follows from dN P R R =dm = @N P R R =@m = Aq > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5 (i) Di¤erentiating equilibrium thresholdâ (see Eq. (4)) gives
That is, for m < 2 = (1 + ) (m > 2 = (1 + )), the number of students (1 â ) increases (decreases), as the tax rate declines. Furthermore, comparative statics yields
where we used Eqs. (18) and (4). The …rst term on the left-hand side is positive. The second term is non-negative if m 2 = (1 + ). Thus, dq o =d < 0 if m is su¢ ciently small.
By contrast, the second term is clearly negative for m = 1 and, as the second term is a continuous function in m, also for m su¢ ciently close to one. Thus, dq o =d > 0 if m is su¢ ciently large.
(ii) Eq. (4) implies that t o =q = (1 + ) = [2 + m = (1 )] and thus @ (t o =q) =@ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
After some rearrangement, we can show that
Recall that m 2 [0; 1] and, as our assumptions guarantee an interior solution (i.e., a 2 (0; 1)), 2â = (1 +â ) 2 (0; 1). Thus, dN P R R =d < 0 (dN P R R =d > 0) results for m = 0 (m = 1). As both m and 2â = (1 +â ) are continuous in m, dN P R R =d < 0 (dN P R R =d > 0) also holds if m is su¢ ciently small (large), i.e., if m is su¢ ciently close to zero (one).
Di¤erentiating (7) 
If m is su¢ ciently large, then the three terms in the square bracket will be positive (see proof of Proposition 5 with respect to the second and third term). Consequently, dN P R P =d > 0 results. By contrast, the second and third term in the square bracket will be negative if m is su¢ ciently small (see again proof of Proposition 5). Moreover, for m = 0, lim !1
Aj m=0 = 0 results. Thus, the positive e¤ect disappears, and dN P R P =d < 0 for m = 0. As dN P R P =d is continuous in m, dN P R P =d < 0 will also hold if m is su¢ ciently close to zero, i.e., if m is su¢ ciently small.
